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1.  Introduction 
Does the enforcement of environmental regulations help or hinder the growth of a 
state’s manufacturing base? There are two opposing responses to this question. Of these, 
the most traditional response is that environmental regulations, and their enforcement, 
tend to hinder growth. Compliance with regulations can be burdensome and costly, thus, 
when firms choose a manufacturing location they will opt for locales in which they 
expect to face less regulation and enforcement. The opposing view suggests that states 
with strict regulations and strict regulatory enforcement should see positive growth in 
their manufacturing base. This view is based on two arguments. First, in comparison with 
labor and manufacturing costs, environmental compliance costs are relatively small. 
Second, valued employees care about quality of life issues, of which the local 
environment is an important component. This view suggests that the benefits of locating 
in states with stricter environmental enforcement might outweigh the costs. 
In this paper we attempt to directly test these two contrasting predictions using 
state-level data on regulatory enforcement and the growth in manufacturing 
establishments.
2 An understanding of whether the level of environmental enforcement 
helps or hinders manufacturing growth is important to a number of constituencies. First, 
environmental economists are interested in answering this question because it can 
provide important insights into how corporations manage the costs and benefits of 
environmental compliance. Second, businesses, whether polluting or not, wish to know 
                                                 
2 It is important to emphasize that we are focusing on the siting of new manufacturing establishments 
within states in our growth regression analysis as opposed to general manufacturing growth from the 
expansion of employment in both new as well as existing facilities.  This is in deference to concerns that 
sufficiently strict environmental enforcement may cause plant closings and relocations to other states with 
more lax environmental enforcement (see, e.g., Gray, 1997).  While this was the focus of the present study, 
a broader measure of growth would clearly be worth considering in subsequent research.   3
whether legislative and regulatory activities help or harm an area’s manufacturing base 
since, in many instances, manufacturing is a basic (export-oriented) industry integral to 
the overall sustainability and growth of a region’s economy. Finally, state regulators and 
legislators need to know whether, and to what extent, their efforts help or harm 
manufacturing growth in order to optimize regulatory enforcement. 
In addition to offering insights into these public policy questions, this study also 
addresses a gap in the literature on economic growth and environmental regulation that is 
important to environmental economists and policy makers alike.  Barro (1991) developed 
a model of economic growth that suggested an econometric procedure that could be used 
to explain differences in economic growth among nations. Several authors have used 
Barro’s approach to attempt to explain differences in economic growth among states.  A 
few papers have used measures of environmental quality and legislation, along with other 
economic variables, to explain economic growth (e.g., Goetz, Ready, and Stone, 1996; 
Polzin, 2001). Results have been mixed.  These papers generally support the notion that 
environmental quality positively affects state economic growth, but there is less support 
for the notion that environmental regulation (enforcement) affects state economic 
growth. 
These findings suggest that the literature has yet to adequately test the impact of 
an environmental (regulatory) regime. To see why, note that a strict environmental 
regime is most likely to affect manufacturers and is less likely to impact service 
industries. If all states’ manufacturing sectors served as their economic base, that is as a 
basic (export-oriented) industry, then state-level measures of economic growth should 
reflect the impact of strict environmental regime.    4
However, the extent to which manufacturing serves as a basic industry to a 
regional economy varies widely in the US. To see this, we’ll employ a common empirical 
measure to identify basic industries, the location quotient (LQ).  Using states as our 
regional economic delineation, the location quotient (LQ) is essentially a ratio of state 
shares of a variable (commonly employment) to the corresponding national share of that 
same variable.  In general, if an industry’s LQ is in excess of one, indicating that a state’s 
employment share of a given industry is larger than the national share, then that industry 
is classified, in economic base theory, as a basic industry whereby much of the 
production of that industry is exported outside the state’s economy. As such, the industry 
generates external revenues that support the growth and development of other (non-basic) 
industries in that state.   
  For example, employment data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis reveal a 
LQ for motor vehicle manufacturing in Michigan in 1995 of 7.17, strongly suggesting, as 
one might suspect, that auto manufacturing is clearly a basic industry and, as such, is a 
significant contributor to Michigan’s economic base.
3 However, not all manufacturing 
industries are basic. In some economies, service industries are contributors to a state’s 
economic basic. For instance, with an LQ of 1.6, the finance and insurance industry 
serves as an important contributor to the economic base of New York, while, with an LQ 
of 2.7, a major basic industry in Nevada is gambling and recreation. If the strictness of a 
state’s environmental regime has differing impacts on economic growth depending on the 
makeup of a state’s economic base then one should use, as a dependent variable, the 
growth rate of each state’s manufacturing base. 
                                                 
3 This data was obtained from http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi/.  The year 1995 was chosen to reflect a 
reasonable LQ calculation for the period under consideration in this study.   5
Further, previous studies have used the number of state-level environmental 
policies to measure the strictness of a state’s environmental regime. This measure is 
questionable for several reasons. First, it is possible that a number of state regulatory 
policies, such as those dealing with landfill sites or those dealing with drinking water 
standards, have little or no impact on a broad range of manufacturers. Second, although 
federal regulations apply to all states, their impact on the manufacturing base depends on 
the degree to which they are enforced, which varies widely across states. Finally, policies 
can and do change over time. Since companies are likely to care less about regulatory 
policy changes and more about the degree and rigor with which policies are enforced, a 
measure of enforcement is desirable. Our methodology addresses these concerns by using 
a measure of environmental inspection proclivity, at the state level, based on three major 
federal environmental acts. 
In constructing this measure, we adopt a procedure employed by List and 
McHone (2000). This procedure uses econometric techniques to purge from a raw 
measure of inspection intensity (based on inspection counts) systematic cross-sectional 
and time-varying effects. In the end we obtain a time-invariant measure of inspection 
proclivities (that is, a measure of the intrinsic importance of environmental protection) 
unique to each state.  Based on this measure, we construct a state ranking of inspection 
proclivity.  Adopting the nomenclature of List and McHone (2000), we refer to this as a 
“conditional ranking”, as opposed to an “unconditional ranking” based solely on the raw 
inspections data. 
Controlling for cross-sectional variation is beneficial since certain industries 
located in only a few states may simply require more inspection activity given the nature   6
of production. Some industries, for instance, are deemed “high priority” industries by the 
US EPA, demanding increased scrutiny. However, higher inspection activity due simply 
to industrial composition does not necessarily signal a greater proclivity to enforce 
regulations relative to other states with a different industrial composition.  It simply may 
reflect, for instance, greater inspection activity required by federal authorities. 
Likewise, controlling for time-varying patterns in inspection activity is useful in 
creating the conditional ranking.  We know that industrial composition can change over 
time as plant closings and openings occur.  If such changes happen in US EPA priority, 
or other high polluting industries, then inspection activity may fluctuate systematically 
over time. However, such changes in inspection rates do not necessarily reflect a change 
in a state’s attitude toward environmental enforcement.  For instance, a state may 
experience plant closings in a high-polluting industry but still may be inclined to 
aggressively inspect plants in other industries, particularly if that state is inherently 
disposed towards maintaining and improving environmental quality. 
To our knowledge, only two other papers constructed state-level environmental 
indexes by following econometric procedures similar to the one we use here.  Henderson 
(1994) for instance, attempts to construct a ranking of state “attitudes” towards air quality 
regulation by employing US Census data on capital expenditure and operating costs data 
for pollution abatement.
4  However, as an indicator of enforcement proclivity this 
construction is indirect at best and possibly inaccurate since there may be other reasons 
for firms to invest in pollution abatement other than compliance (see, e.g. Lyon and 
                                                 
4 This index was used in Henderson (1996) to test if such attitudes impact state ozone readings and did find 
that states with more progressive attitudes towards air quality realizes lower ozone readings, although this 
marginal effect is rather small.  However, he did not test whether or not such attitudes impact business 
location decisions or establishment growth.   7
Maxwell, 2004, and Segerson and Li, 2000 for detailed discussions of “voluntary” or 
“strategic” motivations for pollution abatement).   
As noted above, List and McHone (2000) also construct a state ranking of 
environmental output by state.  As a measure of air quality the ranking is very useful.  
However, our interest is in measuring a state’s proclivity to enforce existing 
environmental regulations.  Therefore, a different dataset is required.  For instance, a 
state may have better air quality than others simply because the composition of the state’s 
economy is dominated by low-polluting industries, having very little to do with the 
relative importance the state places on environmental enforcement.  Fortunately, data on 
inspections do exist.  We can use this data to construct a direct measure of enforcement 
proclivity.  As we will see, our ranking based on inspections data generates different 
rankings than both Henderson (1994) and List and McHone (2000). 
The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we discuss the raw, or 
unconditional, inspections data and its characteristics.  In sections 3 and 4 we discuss the 
need and procedure for developing a conditional ranking in more detail and the resulting 
econometric results.  In section 5 we apply our conditional ranking to an analysis of 
determinants of manufacturing establishment growth. In section 6 we conclude. 
2.  An Unconditional Ranking of Inspections 
The primary goal in this study is to ascertain, through as direct a measure as 
possible, a state’s proclivity toward enforcement of environmental regulations.  To this 
end we focus principally on inspection behavior.
5  We obtained data on inspections 
                                                 
5 Clearly, this is not the only measure of enforcement. One could focus attention on enforcement actions or 
penalties as a measure of enforcement intensity.  Our contention is that inspections are a broader measure 
of enforcement. They indicate a state enforcement authorities’ proclivity to enforce regulations on all 
potential violators.   8
conducted by states for the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) compliance between 1992 and 1998, 
from the US EPA’s Office of Environmental Compliance and Assistance (OECA).
6  To 
measure the intensity of inspection activity, we borrowed a concept from the economic 
geography and regional science literatures, and constructed a “location quotient” (LQ) for 
each state.   
Specifically, we consider the calculation of a location quotient for state 
inspections per facility, LQIN, calculated as follows: 
() ( ) // / STATE STATE US US LQIN IN FAC IN FAC = ,                            (1) 
where IN is the number of inspections and FAC is the number of facilities subject to 
inspections.
7 Table 1 presents information ranking each state’s LQIN.  According to the 
data, the top five states that are most inspection-intensive are Maryland, Alabama, 
Connecticut, Utah, and West Virginia.  The least inspection-intensive states are New 
Mexico, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Alaska, and Iowa. 
In principal one could use this measure, or a ranking based on it, to explain 
differences in the growth of manufacturing facilities across states, but this is too 
simplistic.  This measure does not control for potentially important systematic differences 
among states that may affect inspection intensity, but that have little to do with the true 
level of enforcement intensity a particular facility may expect to receive.  For example, 
the LQIN measure does not take into account the industry mix of the manufacturing base. 
It may be the case that most facilities subject to inspection in, say, New Mexico are 
                                                 
6 The data was made available to us in aggregate.  That is, we do not have available CAA inspections 
separately from either CWA or RCRA inspections.  Since our focus is on overall enforcement intensity the 
breakdown by statute is not of immediate interest. 
7The inspections data are defined on a per facility basis because more inspections will occur where more 
polluting facilities exist.   9
inherently less polluting than most facilities in, say, Alabama. This does not mean, 
however, that a given type of facility (such as an oil refinery) will be inspected less in 
New Mexico than in Alabama. 
Several factors other than industry mix may have similar effects and must be 
controlled for in order to develop a proper estimate of environmental inspection 
proclivity.  These factors include an industry’s historical compliance record in a given 
state, and the relative importance of the polluting industry or industries to a state’s 
economy. Regulators, as a matter of course, inspect more frequently facilities that have 
poor environmental records, or those known to produce high levels of pollution (see, e.g. 
Gray and Deily (1996), Dion, Lanoie, and Laplante (1998), and Decker (2005). At the 
same time, inspectors may shy away from inspecting facilities that are important to a 
state’s economy. Again, however, these concerns will have little to do with the inspection 
intensity faced by a new facility that may not be crucial to the state’s economic base. 
Additionally, our conditional ranking of inspection proclivity should control for 
the influence of the general political attitudes of the population and the government of the 
state. The rationale for purging the influence of these variables from our measure of 
environmental inspection intensity is that while they are widely thought to influence 
regulatory behavior, political attitude may also influence other variables that also might 
help or hinder the growth of a state’s manufacturing sector.  For example, political 
attitudes might lead to stricter or weaker requirements for the granting of construction 
permits for new facilities or the expansion of existing facilities. Thus, in explaining the 
growth of a state’s manufacturing sector, it may be beneficial to include these political 
attitude variables as separate regressors in order to avoid collinearity problems.   10
3. Construction of the Conditional Ranking 
In this section we develop a conditional ranking, based on LQIN, that has been 
purged of the systematic influences outlined in section 2.  To this end, we assembled 
from a variety of sources a panel dataset that provides information on inspections and 
other variables across states over the period 1992 to 1998.  We then ran fixed effects (FE) 
and random effects (RE) regression models on this data. 
The FE model is: 
,, , it i it t it yX α βδ ε = ++ + ,                                                 (2) 
where  , it y  is each state i’s LQIN for years t = 1992 through 1998, αi is the time-invariant 
estimated state constant variable, δt estimated time constant variable (for the years 1992 
through 1998),  , it X  is a 50 by 7 matrix of independent variables believed to influence 
LQIN, and  , εitis a white noise error.  Since our goal is to isolate a time-invariant state 
enforcement proclivity statistic, our resulting conditional ranking should be reflected in 
the estimated αi’s. These coefficients, by construction, give us a time-invariant measure 
of inspection activity by state that is not explained by the independent variables defining 
, it X . Companies can see this behavior but standard statistical analysis can’t reveal this 
attitude. 
A FE is appropriate when one is confident that the cross-section and time series 
units can be viewed as parametric shifts in the regression.  However, if the cross-section 
and time series constant terms are random variables distributed across cross-sectional and 
time series units, then the RE model,  ,, , it i it t it yu X α βδ ε = ++ ++ , is appropriate.  As we 
detail in Section 4, the Hausman test for FE versus RE strongly favors the FE model.   11
More complete definitions and explicit construction of the independent variables 
used in our regression analysis are described in greater detail in this paper’s appendix 
(Table A1).  Our fixed effects model is: 
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The independent variables enter equation (2) as location quotients to ensure consistency 
in the error term.
8  The variable LQENAVG measures the average number of per facility 
enforcement actions levied over the four years prior to current inspections by states for 
CAA, CWA and RCRA violations (relative to the number of actions per facility levied at 
the US level).  As with the inspection data, the enforcement data was provided by OECA.  
We expect higher relative prior enforcement actions to subsequently prompt more 
frequent inspections (see, e.g. Harrington, 1988). 
In addition, as many studies have shown, higher per capita pollutant releases are 
likely to prompt greater state-level inspection activity.  Our measure of pollution releases 
comes from the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) database.
9  Using this data, we 
constructed LQTRI, which measures per capital TRI releases for EPA designated core 
chemicals by state relative to per capita TRI releases. The reason we use the two-year lag 
of LQTRI as an explanatory variable is that the TRI data tends to be released to the 
                                                 
8To be sure, there are a number of possible specifications for equation (2) and we tried a number of them.  
The one we decided upon here offered the most reasonable results in terms of goodness of fit. 
9 The TRI data can be obtained quite easily at http://www.epa.gov/triexplorer/. The population data was 
obtained by the US Department of Commerce’s Regional Economic Information Service (REIS). The REIS 
data can be queried at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/reis/.   12
general public with about an eighteen month lag.  We would expect to see a positive 
coefficient result. 
It is also reasonable to presume that certain industries might experience more 
inspections given the amount and nature of the pollutant releases involved.  Indeed, the 
EPA has designated several industries as “high priority” industries requiring increased 
scrutiny.
10  The five industries relevant here are pulp and paper (SIC 26), chemical 
manufacturing (SIC 28), petroleum refining (SIC 29), rubber and plastics (SIC 30), and 
iron and steel (SIC 33).  To incorporate this effect, we constructed variables (LQTRI26, 
LQTRI28, LQTRI29, LQTRI30, and LQTRI33) to measure, for each state, an industry’s 
TRI releases per dollar’s worth of GSP in that same industry relative to each state’s 
overall TRI releases per dollar’s worth of state manufacturing GSP.
11  We would expect 
higher inspection intensity in those states whose TRI releases are proportionately larger 
in these sectors. Therefore, positive coefficients on these variables are anticipated. 
In addition to pollutant releases, inspectors may consider the level of production 
as an additional indication of a firm’s potential to violate environmental law.  As a 
measure of aggregate production, we utilize the US Department of Commerce’s real 
gross state product (GSP) data.  We construct LQGSP to measure overall real gross state 
product per capita relative to US real gross national product per capita. 
Moreover, for reasons stated earlier, we also consider production levels (as 
measured by industry-level GSP) for the five priority industries identified above as well.  
                                                 
10 The US EPA’s Office of Compliance and Enforcement publishes this list annually in its Enforcement and 
Compliance Accomplishments reports.  See 
http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/reports/planning/results/fy98accomplishment.pdf for details. 
11 Industry level gross state production (GSP) data is available from the US Department of Commerce at 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp.htm.  The reason we focus on industry releases relative to total 
manufacturing GSP is because during the 1990s the TRI data was collected only for these industries 
classified as manufacturing sectors.   13
Each of these LQs measure the share of each industry’s GSP to total manufacturing GSP 
for each state divided by the same share for the nation as a whole. 
The prior expectation of each of these variables’ marginal effect on LQIN is 
unclear. While we might expect that greater industrial production generates the potential 
for greater environmental harm thereby prompting more inspections, it is possible that 
some of these sectors represent a relatively powerful economic interest within a particular 
state.  To the extent that such industries may have been able to “capture” environmental 
enforcement officials, it might be the case that the resulting effects of all or some subset 
of these GSP LQs could have a negative impact on LQIN.  Hence, a clear prior 
expectation is not easily identified. 
Other control variables include population density (LQDENSITY), general 
political attitudes of the population (LQCIT and LQELEC) and elected officials 
(LQGOV).  With respect to population density, we would expect to see greater inspection 
intensity the greater the concentration of citizens at risk of environmental harm.  Political 
attitudes of a state’s citizenry are measured by LQCIT and LQELEC.  LQCIT comes 
from Berry, Ringquest, Fording, and Hanson (1998) and measures the ratio of a state’s 
“citizen political ideology” score to the US average over the period 1990 to 1998.   
Citizen political ideology is generally thought of as a state’s mean position on a liberal-
conservative continuum primarily based on voting behavior in local, US congressional, 
and presidential elections. This index is constructed in such a way that the higher the 
index, the more “liberal” the state (see Berry et al. for details). These indexes don’t 
necessarily give an indication of how politically active state’ population is.  To measure 
how politically active state citizens are, we include LQELEC.  Because in general US   14
citizens are more active in presidential elections, LQELEC measures the percent of the 
voting population by state for the presidential elections 1988, 1992 and 1996. We expect 
each to have a positive effect on LQIN. 
LQGOV, again based on Berry, et al. (1998), is the ratio of a state’s “elected 
public official political ideology” score to the US average.  Elected officials’ political 
ideologies can be thought of generally as a state’s mean position on a liberal-conservative 
continuum. But here the scores are based on publicly available voting behavior of these 
elected officials on a number of issues classified as “liberal” vs. “conservative.” This 
index is constructed in such a way that the higher the index, the more “liberal” the state 
(see Berry et al. (1998) for details).  Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables 
used in equation (2) as well as the variables used in our subsequent business formation 
growth regressions.
12 
4. Panel Estimation Results 
The FE and RE results are presented in Table 3.  In order to test which model is 
better suited to the data we ran a Hausman test.  We found the Hausman statistic to be 
45.96 which, with 17 degrees of freedom, strongly favors the FE model.  Moreover, we 
are explaining about 79 percent of the variation in LQIN and the F-statistic from our 
model suggests that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that our estimated 
coefficients on all of our independent variables are jointly equal to zero. 
                                                 
12 Ideally, other important variables would be included in our model, such as number of inspectors 
employed, or perhaps a measure of state-level environmental budgets. However, we were unable to locate 
inspector employment data by state.  We were, however, able to obtain some data for state-level 
environmental budgets for the sub-period 1994 to 1998 from the Environmental Council of the States.  
While this did limit the size of our dataset, we did introduce this variable in several ways (as a share of total 
state budgets, on a per-capita basis, and as an LQ where state environmental budgets per capita were 
divided by total state budgets per capita).  In each instance the variable proved statistically insignificant and 
generated poorer overall statistical results. As such we have chosen to present the results without this data. 
To be sure, there is still merit in pursuing such data extensions.  By way of future research, it may be 
beneficial to survey state environmental agencies to determine the number of inspectors employed.    15
In the interest of brevity, we will highlight only a few key results from the FE 
model.  First, as evidenced by the significance of LQENAVG, we find that historical 
noncompliance does statistically impact subsequent inspection intensity.  Moreover, the 
results indicate that in more densely populated states inspection activity is more 
intensive. 
We also find that inspection intensity tends to be greater in states with more 
politically active residents (as indicated by the significance of the LQELEC and LQCIT 
variables).  As far as specific sectors are concerned, we find that higher relative emissions 
in pulp and paper plants tend to lead to significant increases in relative inspection 
activity.  Interestingly, results indicate that chemical plants are inspected relatively less 
intensively, ceteris paribus, which may be indicating the possibility of industrial capture 
in this sector or the possibility of industry self-regulation measures.
13 
In terms of the relationship between pollution releases and inspection intensity, 
there is some evidence that higher TRI releases per GSP prompt more intensive 
inspection activity in the pulp and paper and chemical manufacturing sectors, ceteris 
paribus.  However, contrary to expectation, we find the higher TRI releases per GSP in 
the oil refining sector prompt less subsequent inspection intensity.
14 
In terms of the resulting conditional state ranking obtained from the FE model 
presented in Table 4, we find some significant differences when compared to the 
unconditional ranking.  We find that the four states with the highest inspection proclivity 
                                                 
13 See Lyon and Maxwell (2004) for a detailed study of corporate motivations for self-regulation, including 
the American Chemistry Council’s (formally, the Chemical Manufacturing Association) creation of the 
self-regulatory Responsible Care program. 
14 This counter-intuitive result is certainly troubling and, while it is the case that relative to the other sectors 
TRI releases in this sector are relatively small, this result may suggest that for this sector, a more refined 
measure of pollution may be necessary.   16
are Wyoming, Utah, West Virginia, and Alabama, while the four with the least proclivity 
are New Jersey, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. 
It is worth pointing out some similarities and differences with existing state 
environmental rankings.  For instance, List and McHone’s (2000) rankings of states 
based on air pollution places Wyoming eleventh, a relatively high ranking.  That is, 
Wyoming will tend to have relatively few ozone monitors indicating exceedance of 
federal air quality regulations.  To be sure, there are some striking differences as well.  In 
contrast to our finding that New Jersey has the lowest inspection proclivity, List and 
McHone (2000) find that New Jersey tended to have the smallest percentage of ozone 
monitors indicating larger than allowable pollutant releases. 
5.  State Environmental Regulatory Attitudes and New Business Formation 
The growth model.  One application of the state ranking is to test whether or not 
a state’s inspection proclivity impacts the economic landscape of a state. There are a 
number of studies that have investigated the relationship between plant location, 
production decisions and environmental regulation.
15  Using state-level data on new 
manufacturing plant construction, Gray (1997) for instance, found that fewer new plants 
were built in those states where environmental enforcement was more aggressive.  Other 
studies suggest alternative conclusions.  Goetz, Ready, and Stone (1996), for instance, 
investigated the impact various measures of state environmental quality have on the 
growth in state per capita income.  Their state environmental policy index (which 
incorporates 17 policy areas including a number of enforcement policies such as 
hazardous waste management and groundwater protection plans) was found to have no 
statistical impact on per capita income growth.   
                                                 
15 See, for instance, Jeppesen, List, and Folmer (2002), List and Co (2000), and Gray (1997).   17
While both studies have substantial merit, there are a number of aspects that, in 
light of our results so far, deserve some re-consideration. First, Gray’s (1997) results 
treated enforcement, measured as number of inspections, as exogenous and independent 
of his other model variables, including industry output. However, our results suggest that 
inspections are indeed endogenous, influenced by, among other variables, industry 
output. Hence, Gray’s (1997) results linking enforcement with plant location may be pre-
mature and further investigation is in order.  With respect to Goetz, Ready, and Stone 
(1996), their results are based on an environmental index measure that embodied a 
variety of policy variables, not simply enforcement and thus any deference to the 
enforcement effect on growth was at best indirect. 
In this section we apply an economic growth model similar to Goetz, Ready, and 
Stone, which is largely an adaptation of Barro’s (1991) growth study.  Rather than focus 
on employment or income growth directly, more consistent with Gray’s analysis, we use 
new establishment data for the period 1990 to 2000 from the Small Business 
Administration (SBA).  We look at overall growth between 1990 and 2000 for 
manufacturing establishments and test the impact of our conditional (and unconditional) 
index on this growth.  We then look at growth patterns between 1990 and 2000 for small 
establishments (generally defined by the SBA as having fewer than 500 employees) and 
large establishments (500 or more employees). 
The empirical model specified is  
α ββ
ββ β β
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     (4) 
MAN1990 and MAN2000 measure the number of manufacturing establishments counted 
by state in 1990 and 2000, respectively.  PRODUCTIVITYGR measures the growth in   18
GSP per worker between 1990 and 2000. One would expect this variable to positively 
impact growth. EDUC measures the percent of a state’s population with a high school 
degree or higher.  We would expect this variable to have a positive effect on new 
establishment growth.  TAXIND is an index constructed by the Tax Foundation 
measuring the business tax climate by state.
16  The higher the index, the more favorable 
the tax structure is to business. We would expect this variable to have a positive effect on 
growth.  GREENINDEX is the same environmental policy index used by Goetz, Ready, 
and Stone (2000).  INSRANK is simply the ranking based on INLQ from Table 1, and 
INSRANKCOND is the INLQ conditioned on the explanatory variables and what are 
represented in Table 4. 
Econometric Results.  In Table 5 we present the results of the above 
specification when using INSRANK and INSRANKCOND, respectively.  In Table 6 we 
present the results of two estimations using only INSRANKCOND in both. The first 
looks at growth of large establishments where MANLG1990 and MANLG2000 measure 
the number of manufacturing establishments counted by state that employ 500 or more 
workers in 1990 and 2000, respectively.  The second looks at growth of smaller 
establishments where MANSM1990 and MANSM2000 measure the number of 
manufacturing establishments counted that employ less than 500 workers. 
Based on the adjusted R
2 and F-statistics, we see that the growth specification 
employing INSRANKCOND offers a better explanation of manufacturing establishment 
growth.  There is little evidence of growth convergence across states as evidenced by the 
positive and insignificant sign on MAN1990.  The educational attainment of a state’s 
population proves insignificant (a result consistent with a variety of studies such at 
                                                 
16 This data was obtained from http://www.facilitycity/busfac/bf_03_06_exclusive1.asp, November, 2003.   19
Polzin, 2001).  Moreover, TAXIND and GREENINDEX are not significant indicators of 
establishment growth. 
There is some evidence to support the notion that firms are attracted to build new 
plants in states with more productive workforces and in states with lower poverty rates.
17  
Importantly, as indicated by the negative and significant impact of INSRANKCOND, we 
do see that manufacturing establishment growth is slowed in states with more intensive 
environmental inspection activity, ceteris paribus.  While this impact conforms to prior 
expectation, it is worthwhile to point out that had just the unconditional ranking been 
employed, we would not have concluded that any impact exits.  Nonetheless, once our 
conditional measure of inspection intensity is constructed, we do find a negative impact 
on business growth. 
It is also interesting to note that, as we see in Table 6, INSRANKCOND's impact 
on establishment growth is consistent across size of production facilities.  Growth in 
establishments generating 500 or more jobs is slower in states with a higher inspection 
proclivity ranking to nearly the same degree as growth in smaller establishments 
(employing less than 500 people) is retarded.  That said, the results do point out some 
other differences in determinants of manufacturing establishment growth.  For instance, 
smaller facilities tend to be attracted to states with higher productivity levels and lower 
poverty rates.  However, firms tend to build larger facilities in states with a more 
favorable business tax climate. 
                                                 
17 The statistical significance of PRODUCTIVITYGR and the insignificance of EDUC may be picking up 
certain unobservable characteristics of the manufacturing establishment data.  It may be that most of the 
establishments constructed are primarily the production and distribution of goods for which an established 
market exists.  Were it possible to distinguish between production and distribution facilities and, say new 
product development and R&D facilities, EDUC may be a significant determinant of the latter and not of 
the former.   20
VI.   Conclusion 
When utilizing a more direct measure of enforcement to construct a conditional 
ranking of a state’s proclivity towards environmental regulations, we find results that 
differ from existing rankings that measure such effects indirectly.  When applied to the 
question of whether or not enforcement of existing regulations influences the growth of 
business establishment formation, we find that our conditional ranking of inspection 
proclivity does indeed have a significant deterring effect on such growth.  Thus, our 
results generally support the notion that enforcement of environmental regulation hinders 
a state’s manufacturing growth prospects. 
There are several directions for future research.  First, it may be of interest to 
conduct a similar analysis of the European Union and compare enforcement proclivity’s 
impact on manufacturing growth with that of the United States.  Second, it would be of 
interest to re-consider this analysis in a contemporary setting.  For instance, states with a 
greater proclivity towards aggressive enforcement likely prompt improved compliance 
and better environmental stewardship on the part of its existing manufacturing base. If a 
cap-and-trade policy is adopted, these manufacturing firms may find themselves with a 
competitive advantage in carbon trading which many provide opportunities. We leave 
these questions for future research.   21
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Table 1. Unconditional State Rankings fore LQIN
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A.  Variables used in inspections equation
LQIN 0.978 0.501 450
LQENAVG 0.992 0.429 446
LQTRI 1.282 1.558 450
LQELEC 1.049 0.145 450
LQCIT 1.000 0.284 450
LQGOV 1.034 0.567 450
LQDENSIT 2.178 2.902 450
LQGSP 0.966 0.168 450
LQGSP26 1.099 1.031 450
LQGSP28 0.957 0.945 450
LQGSP29 1.406 2.269 450
LQGSP30 0.947 0.474 450
LQGSP33 0.940 0.810 450
LQTRI26 0.972 1.169 450
LQTRI28 1.152 2.902 450
LQTRI29 1.123 1.770 450
LQTRI30 1.070 0.977 450
LQTRI33 0.789 1.748 450
B.  Variables used in establishment growth equations 
MAN2000 14,145.020 15,942.670 50
MAN1990 13,577.140 16,130.930 50
MANLG2000 4,186.840 4,414.917 50
MANLG1990 2,559.120 2,864.032 50
MANSM2000 9,958.180 11,696.210 50
MANSM1990 11,018.020 13,337.120 50
PRODUCTIVITYGR 1.161 0.115 50
EDUC 0.197 0.025 50
TAXIND 5.996 1.096 50
GREENINDEX 
INSRANK 25.500 14.577 50
INSRANKCOND 25.500 14.577 50  25
 
Table 3. Panal Regression Results (Fixed and Random Effects Models)
Dep. Var.: LQIN 
   Fixed Effects (FE) Random  Effects  (RE) 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value    
Constant -1.3621 0.1230 0.6444 0.1502   
LQENAVG 0.0003 0.0315 ** 0.0003 0.0276  ** 
LQTR[-2] 0.0130 0.7396 0.0326 0.2419   
LQELEC 0.5784 0.0540 * -0.1280 0.5918  
LQCIT 0.2639 0.0808 * 0.0269 0.8306   
LQGOV -0.0559 0.3127 0.0063 0.8883   
LQDENSIT 0.6083 0.0044 *** -0.0048 0.8255   
LQGSP 0.1826 0.7155 0.0921 0.7505   
LQGSP26 0.2104 0.0014 *** 0.1429 0.0010  *** 
LQGSP28 -0.1248 0.0962 * 0.0818 0.0753  * 
LQGSP29 -0.0015 0.9534 0.0053 0.7403   
LQGSP30 -0.1589 0.1527 -0.0375 0.6586   
LQGSP33 0.0619 0.3673 0.1317 0.0096  *** 
LQTRI26[-2] 0.0346 0.0835 * 0.0290 0.1233   
LQTRI28[-2] 0.0134 0.0658 * 0.0049 0.4718   
LQTRI29[-2] -0.0562 0.0009 *** -0.0388 0.0113  ** 
LQTRI30[-2] 0.0257 0.4120 0.0020 0.9430   
LQTRI33[-2] -0.0255 0.2224 -0.0091 0.6101   
    
Adj. R
2 0.79 0.35  
F Statistic (75,374) 18.88 0.000000 ***  
    
LM Statistic (2 d.f.)
1 567.80 0.000000 ***  
Hausman Statistic (17 d.f.)
2 45.96 0.000175 ***    
    
*   - Significant at the 10% level.   
**  - Significant at the 5% level.   
*** - Significant at the 1% level.   
1Higher values of the LM statistic favor the FE or RE models over the   
2Higher values of the Hausman statistic favor the FE model over the RE model.  26
 
Table 4. Conditional State Rankings fore LQIN
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Table 5.  Growth in Manufacturing Establishments, 1990-2000
Dep. Var.: Ln(MAN2000)-Ln(MAN1990)   
Variable Coefficient Coefficient  
   
C -0.1397 0.0394  
  (0.5991) (0.8302)  
MAN1990 -0.000003 0.0000015  
  (0.2575) (0.2695)  
PRODUCTIVITYGR 0.0103 0.0241 *** 
  (0.1797) (0.0001)  
EDUC -0.6076 0.2082  
  (0.4172) (0.7297)  
POVRATE -0.3718 -1.1897 ** 
  (0.5113) (0.0288)  
TAXIND 0.0307 * 0.0255    
  (0.1062) (0.1144)  
INSRANK 0.0014  
  (0.2909)  
INSRANKCOND -0.0062 *** 
  (0.0023)  
GREENINDEX 0.0029 ** 0.0004    
  (0.0255) (0.8330)  
   
Adj. R
2 0.13 0.35  
F Statistic  2.09 * 4.76 *** 
   (0.0659) (0.0005)   
   
Note: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance.
p-values in parentheses.  
*   - Significant at the 10% level.   
**  - Significant at the 5% level.   
*** - Significant at the 1% level.     28
 
Table 6.  Growth in Manufacturing Establishments by Size, 1990-2000
Dep. Var.: Ln(MANx2000)-Ln(MANx1990)
1   
   Employment > 500 Employment <500 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient  
   
C -0.6386 * 0.1064   
  (0.0807) (0.5454)  
MANx1990 -0.000001 0.000002   
  (0.9582) (0.1690)  
PRODUCTIVITYGR 0.0194 0.0280  *** 
  (0.6510) (0.0000)  
EDUC 1.2950 0.1579   
  (0.1772) (0.7910)  
POVRATE  (1.2208) -(1.6253) ** 
  (0.1748) (0.0038)  
TAXIND 0.0469 * 0.0235     
  (0.0657) (0.1469)  
INSRANKCOND -0.0078 *** -0.0061  ** 
  (0.0007) (0.0032)  
GREENINDEX -0.0012 0.0010     
  (0.6217) (0.5731)  
   
Adj. R
2 0.41 0.26   
F Statistic  5.69 *** 2.53  ** 
   (0.0001) (0.0345)    
   
1x=LG, SM.   
Note: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance.  
p-values in parentheses.  
*   - Significant at the 10% level.   
**  - Significant at the 5% level.   
*** - Significant at the 1% level.     29
Appendix Table A1.  Variable Construction 
Variable Definitions  LQ Construction 
















LQENAVG Enforcement  actions  Four-year average of LQEN prior to LQIN 
LQTRI  Per capita TRI releases (only the original 







TRI POP  
 
LQELEC  % of voting population by state for 







VOTE POP  
LQCIT  Ratio of a state’s “citizen political ideology” 
score to the US average (Berry, Ringquist, 









LQGOV  Ratio of a state’s “elected public official 
political ideology” score to the US average 
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GDP POP  
LQGSP26  % GSP in SIC 26 (pulp and paper) of total 








GDP GDPMAN  
LQGSP28  % GSP in SIC 28 (chemicals) of total 








GDP GDPMAN  
LQGSP29  % GSP in SIC 29 (petroleum refining) of 








GDP GDPMAN  
LQGSP30  % GSP in SIC 30 (rubber and plastics) of 








GDP GDPMAN  
LQGSP33  % GSP in SIC 33 (iron and steel) of total 
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